We assess whether and to what extent …nancial activity in the oil futures markets has contributed to destabilize oil prices in recent years. We de…ne a destabilizing …nancial shock as a shift in oil prices that is not related to current and expected fundamentals, and thereby distorts e¢ cient pricing in the oil market. Using a structural VAR model identi…ed with sign restrictions, we disentangle this non-fundamental …-nancial shock from fundamental shocks to oil supply and demand to determine their relative importance. We …nd that shocks to oil demand and supply remain the main drivers of oil price swings. Financial investors in the futures market can however destabilize oil spot prices, although only in the short run. Moreover, …nancial activity appears to have exacerbated gyrations in the oil market over the past decade,
Introduction
The massive oil price ‡uctuations observed in the last few years led many commentators to reexamine the functioning of the price-setting mechanism in the oil market (Khan 2009 , Kaufmann and Ullman 2009 and Miller and Ratti 2009 ). 1 The increasing …nancialization of the oil futures markets was blamed by some as the main driver of the escalation of oil prices, in addition to the more conventional explanations of surging demand and tight oil supply. It is indeed true that the oil futures market has become increasingly liquid, and the activity of agents that do not deal with physical oil, the so-called 'non-commercials', has greatly increased. Furthermore, passive index funds, whose goal is to provide investors with long-only exposure to oil, have witnessed substantial in ‡ows in recent years (CFTC 2008 ). This led some to hypothesize that such in ‡ows in the futures market may have pushed oil prices above the level warranted by fundamental forces of supply and demand. This paper evaluates the relative importance of …nancial activity in determining the spot price of oil. Using a sign-restricted structural VAR model which is estimated on global oil market data over the last two decades, we disentangle the in ‡uence of a …nancial shock that distorts e¢ cient pricing in the oil market. We quantify its contribution in generating ‡uctuations in the oil price, with respect to oil supply and demand shocks conventionally studied in the literature. The novel contribution of this paper is that we focus on …nancial shocks in the futures market not linked to current and expected fundamentals. The identi…cation restrictions employed to single out those shocks are derived from a simple theoretical model that links the spot price of oil to the futures price through a no-arbitrage condition. The …nancial shock drives a wedge in the noarbitrage condition, and hence drifts the oil price away from the level justi…ed by market fundamentals. For this reason, we label the structural disturbance as a destabilizing …nancial shock.
Elaborating upon the work of Peersman and Van Robays (2009a,b) and Kilian and Murphy (2010) by explicitly including the futures market in a sign-restricted VAR, we identify four di¤erent types of oil shocks: an oil supply shock, an oil demand shock driven by economic activity, an oil-speci…c demand shock which captures changes in oil demand 1 other than those caused by economic activity, and a destabilizing …nancial shock.
Our results suggest that …nancial activity in the futures market can signi…cantly destabilize oil prices in the spot market, although only in the short run. In contrast, fundamental shocks to oil supply and demand cause oil prices to shift permanently. Over di¤erent forecast horizons, the destabilizing …nancial shock only explains about 10 percent of the total variability in oil prices, as shocks to fundamentals account for about 90 percent of the short-run forecast error variance decomposition over our sample. Moreover, we …nd that …nancial investors did cause oil prices to diverge signi…cantly from the level justi…ed However, the distinction made between speculative activity (i.e. non-commercial trading) and non-speculative activity (i.e. commercial trading or hedging) may be arbitrary in some cases, and the publicly available data on speculative trading activity is not completely representative of all sorts of …nancial activity in these futures markets. 2 For example, the above-mentioned index funds only enter on the long side of the crude oil futures market to hedge. Although the activity of index funds is typically not regarded as speculation, as they follow a passive investment strategy, they may distort price formation by creating additional demand for futures contracts. This type of …nancial activity is not accounted for when using non-commercial trading data to assess the impact of speculative trading on the oil price. Moreover, studies that want to evaluate the role of the index funds directly using trader's position data, also have to rely on rough approximations. 3 For this reason, we assess the impact of …nancial activity on oil spot prices without relying on trader position data. Moreover, we only evaluate the impact of …nancial activity that e¤ectively distorts price formation in the oil market, and can create deviations in the oil price from the level justi…ed by oil demand and supply-side fundamentals. In this sense, we build upon the work of Kilian and Murphy (2010) . They also identify a speculation shock, but de…ne it in terms of additional demand for inventories, which necessarily a¤ects the spot price of oil. The aim of our paper, instead, is to focus on non-fundamental shocks to the futures market and remain agnostic about the impact of such destabilizing …nancial activity on oil prices and inventory holdings in the spot market, as the exact transmission to the oil spot market is not known explicitly.
A second strand of related literature examines the e¤ect of changing oil demand and supply-side fundamentals on the oil price. In addition to the non-fundamental shock, we identify shocks to oil market supply and demand-side fundamentals. and Pagano (2010) highlight that expansionary monetary policy may have fueled oil price increases, but also report that it appears to exert its impact through expectations of higher in ‡ation and growth, rather than on the ‡ow of global liquidity into oil futures markets.
By identifying both fundamental and non-fundamental oil shocks, we are able to balance the importance of fundamentals against that of ine¢ cient …nancial activity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in the next section we cast a formal de…nition of destabilizing …nancial activity in a simple theoretical framework. We describe the VAR model speci…cation and the identi…cation strategy in Section 3, and discuss the empirical results in Section 4; Section 5 concludes.
Understanding …nancial activity in oil futures markets
In the oil futures markets, we can separate desirable 'stabilizing'from undesirable 'destabilizing'…nancial activity. The former relates to the fact that agents intervening in the oil futures market bring their information sets and expectations on future fundamentals into the pricing mechanism, thereby contributing to the price-discovery mechanism, in addition to making the markets more liquid. However, if agents place their bets disregarding the expectations on fundamentals the price-setting mechanism can be distorted. Only this latter type of ine¢ cient …nancial activity matters to policy makers and regulators, and we will regard this non-fundamental …nancial shock in the futures markets as related to …nancial activity. In this section, we clarify the concept of destabilizing …nancial trading by looking at the functioning of oil futures markets and the link between the futures and the spot market for crude oil.
The oil futures market
Futures markets exist as a means of transferring risks of price ‡uctuations. Typically, traders in the oil futures market are dividied in two categories, i.e. commercials and noncommercials. Agents who deal with physical oil, often labeled as commercials, may wish to hedge against price ‡uctuations by …xing in advance the price they will have to pay or receive for a delivery in the future. Oil producers will therefore have the opportunity to secure their income today by selling futures contracts, and oil consumers will buy futures contracts in order to pin down their future costs. Yet, agents not dealing with physical oil also participate to the market, making the oil market more liquid. These non-commercials intervene in oil futures market because they want to achieve exposure to oil price risk, either on the upside or downside, to make a pro…t.
Typically, speculation in the oil market is attributed to the …nancial activity of traders that actively enter the futures market and buy or sell according to (expected) fundamentals. The CFTC ascribes speculative activity to non-commercial traders that make pro…ts based on their expectations of the future oil supply-demand balance. Without relying on trader position data, Kilian and Murphy (2010) also de…ne speculation in the oil market as related to oil fundamentals, i.e. a speculation shock in their framework is "any oil demand shock that re ‡ects shifts in expectations about future oil production or future real activity (p.9)".
In reality, however, movements in futures prices may not always re ‡ect e¢ cient pricing of the expected oil supply-demand balance. For example, agents may intervene in the futures market not because they have expectations on the future dynamics of oil fundamentals, but rather because they want to allocate part of their portfolio to oil. There is a good motivation to do so, as commodities are commonly thought to be a hedge against in ‡ation, and to be negatively correlated with stock market indices. Commodity-related index funds were created to allow investors to easily achieve exposure to commodity price risk, and accordingly they only enter on the long side of the crude oil futures market, independent on whether future oil fundamentals are strong or weak. Although they follow a passive trading strategy, these …nancial funds may distort price formation by causing oil prices to deviate from levels justi…ed by current or expected fundamentals. The magnitude of the in ‡ows into such index funds is precisely one of the reasons why many observers attributed for the recent volatile behavior of oil prices to speculation. This type of speculation, or more generally …nancial activity, is not captured by looking at non-commercial positions because index fund traders are regarded as commercial traders. Neither is it speci…cally captured in the framework employed by Kilian and Murphy (2010) . 4 To wrap up, we de…ne destabilizing …nancial trading in oil markets based on identifying two types of …nancial activity in the oil futures market. The …rst type occurs on the back of changing expectations about oil market fundamentals. This does not distort the e¢ cient functioning of the oil market, but rather enhances the oil price formation mechanism by bringing in new information on expected fundamentals. Conversely, the second type of …nancial activity occurs independently of (current and expected) oil supply and demand fundamentals, thereby distorting e¢ cient pricing in the futures and spot market by causing prices to deviate from their levels justi…ed by fundamentals. We de…ne this type of trading as destabilizing …nancial activity. In the next subsection, we characterize these two types of …nancial activity by analyzing the theoretical link between the oil spot and futures market.
The link between spot and futures prices
Financial activity in the futures market only matters if changes in futures prices can a¤ect oil prices in the spot market. This linkage between the spot and the futures market for oil is commonly represented by a no-arbitrage condition (Pindyck 1993, Alquist and Kilian 2010). We rely on this condition to give a theoretical characterization of the two types of activity in futures markets, fundamental versus non-fundamental, which will also prove useful for the identi…cation of these shocks later on.
Let us consider an investor who holds P t units of the numeraire at time t. He can either invest in a risk-free bond with yield r t , or buy oil, store it and sell it on the futures market for delivery in t + . Buying oil, however, also brings an additional bene…t, in that the investor has access to a commodity that he can exploit, if needed. We will label this bene…t as the convenience yield, and denote it as t;t+ (Pindyck 1993) . By the no-arbitrage principle, the two investment strategies should bear the same return. If we denote the spot price as P t and the future price F t;t+ , we have:
Taking logarithms, and explicitly considering storage costs c t;t+ , Equation (1) is approximated by:
So, if markets are e¢ cient and arbitrage opportunities are exploited instantaneously, Equation (2) would hold. If the convenience yield, net of storage costs, is positive, this will imply that spot prices are higher than futures, which explains why the futures curve in commodities markets is often negatively sloped (backwardation). However, if storage costs are higher than the convenience yield, it would be possible to observe a positive-sloped futures curve (contango). Rewriting Equation (2) gives an expression of the futures price in terms of the spot oil price, the convenience yield, storage costs and the risk-free rate:
Pindyck (1994) postulates a relationship between the convenience yield on the one hand, and oil inventories and expected demand on the other:
where I t is the level of inventories, E(D t;t+ ) is the expected demand over period t to t + and G denotes a generic function. 5 G is decreasing in I t since at times of low inventories the marginal yield of an additional unit is higher. This conjecture is also supported by the empirical analysis presented by Einloth (2009) . At the same time, storage costs will also be positively in ‡uenced by the level of inventories: a low level of inventories would imply large availability of storage facilities, while a high level is associated with di¢ culties in …nding storage and hence rising costs. Hence, storage costs and the convenience yield react oppositely to a change in inventories, but given that they appear with opposite signs in Equation (3), their impact on the spot price will cumulate. Given that a change in current demand and supply will produce a change in the current level of inventories, the convenience yield will also move.
Conversely, G will be increasing in E(D t;t+ ) since higher expected demand makes holding inventories more appealing, as future market tightness is expected. Of course, higher expected demand in the future will also lead to an increase in inventories, which would partially counteract the increase in convenience yield both via the direct impact in the G function and via an increase in storage costs. However, we think it is reasonable to assume that the increase in inventories will not manage to immediately o¤set the impact of future tightness on the convenience yield. This is because real-world frictions cause inventory building to take time; agents have to …nd a producer, a storage facility and wait for shipment. Therefore, in the following we will assume that the overall impact at time t 5 There is no need to specify the functional form of the function G in more detail, as the identi…cation of the di¤erent types of oil shocks will only depend on the sign of the relationship between the convenience yield and its determinants. The G function may as well be nonlinear, the only requirement should be that it is monotonic in its two arguments.
of an increase in future market tightness is positive on the convenience yield net of storage costs. 6 Note that also expected future supply tightness will increase the convenience yield of holding inventories. Hence, we can assume that the term E(D t;t+ ) captures the overall e¤ect of expected fundamentals on the convenience yield.
Substituting Equation (4) into Equation (3) gives the following:
In the e¢ cient, no-arbitrage case, the futures price depends positively on the current spot price, inventories, the risk-free rate and storage costs, and negatively on expected oil fundamentals.
If agents in the economy are homogeneous, they will all have access to the same information set and process the ‡ow of news homogeneously, so that Equation (5) will always hold. More speci…cally, all other things equal, futures prices will be moved by the ‡ow of news on current fundamentals and the level of inventories, as well as by news related to expectations on future demand and supply. Based on this news on current and expected fundamentals, agents place their bets in both the futures and spot market and thereby change the futures and spot price in line with the no-arbitrage condition, so that it will always hold.
However, players in commodity markets are not likely to be homogeneous, which may alter the textbook functioning of the linkage between spot and futures prices, as also argued by Singleton (2011) . Let us …rst look at the futures market. First, not all agents may have access to the same information about future market fundamentals, or may process the news that they receive di¤erently. This will generate a dispersion of beliefs that may a¤ect the price formation and drive the future price away from the one which would have prevailed had all agents be homogeneous. Second, some agents may place their bets by disregarding expected fundamentals, and rather by attempting to jump on local trends. In addition, there may be players who just enter the market to achieve exposure to commodity price risk. For example, when an index fund receives an in ‡ow by an investor, it will buy oil futures irrespective of its expectations on the oil supply and demand balance. Conversely, if an out ‡ow from an index fund materializes, e.g. because an investor needs to reduce his leverage, the fund will sell oil futures, again irrespective of fundamentals.
Such interventions will also a¤ect the futures price set in the market, thereby generating a deviation from the fundamental no-arbitrage relationship, so that the observed future price becomes:
where f t;t+ is the futures price that would prevail if the no-arbitrage condition was always satis…ed and the price was solely determined by fundamental factors, i.e. the one found in Equation (5). The term f t , which we assume to be weakly stationary, represents the deviation of the observed future price from its no-arbitrage value. This shock f t , which we will label the destabilizing …nancial shock, creates a perturbation in the futures market in the sense that demand for futures contracts driven by the activity of noise traders in the futures markets moves the observed futures price away from its e¢ cient level.
The transmission mechanism to spot prices
How can a perturbation to oil futures prices transmit to oil spot prices? In the no-arbitrage framework, if futures prices deviate away from the no-arbitrage condition, arbitrageurs will intervene and realign prices via the inventory channel. This is exactly how Kilian and Murphy (2010) identify their speculation shock, i.e. as an inventory demand shock in the spot market. 7 In reality, however, there may be frictions that prevent them to do so swiftly. Such frictions cannot be interpreted per se as a source of misalignment in the pricing equations (i.e. they do not constitute a shock), but rather that they impact on the absorption of misalignments (i.e. the speed at which shocks die out). For example, there could be physical limits to arbitrage due to the availability of storage facilities, or arbitrageurs may be capital-constrained (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Acharya et al. (2009) report indeed that the presence of capital constraints to arbitrageurs increases the di¤erence between spot and futures prices. 8 In addition, it could take time to …nd a producer who sells and delivers physical oil to the storage facilities. This implies that in reality deviations from the no-arbitrage conditions may persist. In this respect, Mou (2010) reports that index funds activity is able to signi…cantly move futures prices around the roll-over dates, and that in spite of the dates being known in advance, arbitrageurs do not immediately intervene to exploit the misalignment between spot and futures prices.
The futures price observed on the market is part of the information set of all players in the physical market. How would such players react to changes in futures prices not linked to expected fundamentals? Given that agents are not necessarily homogeneous, some of them may correctly recognize this as a misalignment, and hence try to arbitrage away the di¤erence by changing their inventory holding decisions. Others may instead interpret the price signal as genuinely related to changing expectations on fundamentals, and hence adjust their supply and demand decisions. Moreover, it could also take some time for the agents in the spot market to recognize and interpret this deviation.
A priori, it is thus not exactly known how and via which channel a change in the futures price following a destabilizing speculation shock is transmitted to the spot market, and therefore we remain agnostic on this. More speci…cally, we will decide to leave the response of the spot price, oil production and oil inventories over to the data in the empirical part.
What we do know is that the destabilizing …nancial shock has an impact on the spread.
Let us substitute Equation (5) into Equation (6) to get:
According to Equation (7), the observed futures price is a function of the spot price, current and expected changes related to fundamentals (i.e. the current level of inventories, which is in ‡uenced by current and expected demand and supply and also determines storage costs) and the destabilizing …nancial shock. Futures are thus allowed to vary following current or expected changes to oil supply and demand as well as to destabilizing …nancial activity in the futures market. Hence, Equation (7) captures the two types of activity in oil futures markets described above in Section 2.1.
To see this more clearly, let us rewrite Equation (7) in terms of the observed futuresspot spread:
where s t;t+ is the observed futures-spot spread between t and t + . This equation expresses the spread in terms of a fundamental component (1) and a component (2) that takes into account destabilizing …nancial activity and the chance that prices may be misaligned with respect to the level warranted by (current and expected) fundamentals.
The spread will respond di¤erently depending on the type of oil shock. First, consider a (temporary) tightening in the current supply-demand balance, e.g. an unexpected
supply shortfall because of unrest in an oil-producing country, or a sudden increase in oil demand. These shocks will produce a drawdown of inventories, which in turn increases the convenience yield and decreases storage costs. Therefore, term (1) in Equation (8) will be lower, and the spread will decline. In other words, spot prices will increase more that futures prices do. For oil markets observers, it should not come as a surprise that a negatively-sloped (i.e. backwardated) futures curve is associated with a situation of market tightness which produces high convenience yields.
Second, a shock to expected fundamentals will also move the convenience yield upwards. As mentioned before, such a shock is likely to cause inventory accumulation, which would partly counteract the initial increase. However, we …nd it reasonable to assume that the increase in inventories takes time due to frictions. Therefore, we can conclude that on impact an increase in the expected market tightness will cause a reduction of the spread.
It is possible that after some time, as soon as inventory accumulation materializes, the decline in spread may be counteracted by the e¤ect of the inventory accumulation, but in terms of our identi…cation strategy we remain agnostic on the response of the spread beyond the point of impact. The fact that the convenience yield should increase following an increase in expected tightness in the physical market is also reported in Pindyck (2001) , and our argument is in line with his. 9 Finally, a destabilizing …nancial shock such as an in ‡ow in an index fund will act through term (2) in Equation (8) and push up the spread in absence of changes in the convenience yield. After the shock has hit the futures markets, agents may possibly adjust their inventory holdings and their demand and supply decisions, which may eventually lead to changes in the convenience yield. However, the contemporaneous impact of such a shock on the spread will be positive.
To sum up, a tightening of current and expected fundamentals will contemporaneously a¤ect the spread negatively, whereas the destabilizing …nancial shocks will have a contemporaneous positive impact. The fact that the futures-spot spread reacts di¤erently to the two di¤erent kinds of activity in the futures market (i.e. trading based on fundamentals and destabilizing …nancial activity) will prove crucial to uniquely identify these shocks and their importance later on. 10 To evaluate whether movements in the spread have been related to in ‡ows into index funds, we regressed the changes in the spread on a constant and the in ‡ows into commodity-related index funds as estimated by Barclays. The data used for this simple exercise is monthly and covers the period 2007:01-2010:02. Although the sample size is very short, and the overall R 2 of the regression is low (8.4%), the regression results suggest that the coe¢ cient on the in ‡ows is positive and signi…cant at the 10% level. 11 This indicates that using the impact of non-fundamental trading on the spread, which is key to our identi…cation strategy, is supported by the data.
Model speci…cation and identi…cation
Although the importance of …nancial activity in determining oil price ‡uctuations is still strongly debated, it is common knowledge that, at least in the long run, oil ‡uctuations are mainly driven by changes in oil supply and demand. In order to get a comprehensive view on the determinants of oil prices, we will identify oil price movements that are driven by conventional oil supply and demand shocks in addition to those related to destabilizing …nancial activity.
A structural VAR model
To evaluate the role of the di¤erent types of shocks in determining the oil price, we employ a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) framework that has the following general representation:
The vector of endogenous variables X t captures the global dynamics in the oil spot and futures market by including world oil production (Q oil ), the price of crude oil expressed in US dollars (P oil ), a measure of world economic activity (Y w ), the futures price of oil (F oil ) and oil inventories (I). To avoid redundant variables, we do not include the spread we use the Brent oil price as a global benchmark for the reason that WTI oil is mainly used in the US, and its most recent price movements were mainly re ‡ecting regional surplus inventory capacity at the delivery point of the contract (Cushing, Oklahoma). We proxy global economic activity by the OECD measure of global industrial production, which covers the OECD countries and the six major non-OECD economies, including e.g. China and India. Following Kilian and Murphy (2010), we proxy global crude oil inventories as total US crude oil inventories, scaled by the ratio of OECD petroleum stocks over US petroleum stocks. 12 The VAR model is estimated using monthly data over the sample period 1991:01-2010:02, and we include 12 lags of the endogenous variables. 13 All the variables are transformed to monthly growth rates by taking the …rst di¤erence of the 1 2 We do not include the US Strategic Petroleum Reserves in our measure of inventories. 1 3 Although lag selection criteria propose to only include 2 or 3 lags, we decide to include one year of lags;
this is required to allow for enough dynamics in the macroeconomic variables following an oil shock, see Hamilton and Hererra (2004) . The start of the sample period is determined by the availability of futures price data.
natural logarithm and are corrected for seasonality. In general, the results are robust to di¤erent speci…cations of the variables and the SVAR model, see the discussion in Section 4.4.
Identi…cation of di¤erent types of oil shocks
The recent literature has clearly shown that di¤erent factors can drive oil price movements, and that the economic consequences crucially depend on the underlying source of the oil price change (Kilian 2009 and related papers, Peersman and Van Robays 2009a,b). We identify four di¤erent types of shocks: an oil supply shock, an oil demand shock driven by economic activity, an oil-speci…c demand shock (i.e. the fundamental shocks), and a destabilizing …nancial shock (i.e. the non-fundamental shock). We do this by relying on the following set of sign restrictions: 14 STRUCTURAL SHOCKS
Non-fundamental shocks First, we disentangle the fundamental oil shocks from the non-fundamental …nancial shocks. We do this by imposing opposite signs on the response of the spread, based on Equation (8) . The fundamental shocks which increase oil prices have a negative e¤ect on the futures-spot spread, whereas destabilizing …nancial activity increases the spread after increasing the futures price of oil. 15 Hence, we de…ne the destabilizing …nancial shock as a shock to the futures markets that raises the oil futures price and increases the 1 4 The sign restrictions are shown for oil shocks that increase the oil futures price. A more detailed explanation on the use of sign restrictions can be found in the appendix. 1 5 In order to disentangle the fundamental versus the non-fundamental shocks, we only look at the change in the spread, i.e. the di¤erence between the change in the level of the futures price and the change in the level of the oil spot price. The restriction imposed on the spread does thus not imply that the market should be in contango or backwardation.
futures-spot spread. This could for example re ‡ect the trading behavior of index funds that enter the oil futures market irrespective of oil market fundamentals. We only impose the sign restrictions on the spread on impact, for the reason that the arguments presented in Section 2.3 to motivate our identi…cation strategy via the spread only relate to its contemporaneous reaction. 16 Also note that we do not restrict any of the responses in the oil spot market following a destabilizing …nancial shock, as the e¤ect on the oil spot market and the exact transmission mechanism is a priori unknown. shock is an exogenous shift of the oil supply curve to the left which lowers oil production and increases oil prices, whilst world industrial production does not increase. Exogenous oil production disruptions caused by geopolitical tensions in the Middle-East are a natural example. Consistent with the no-arbitrage condition, oil futures prices will increase after this shock, but less than proportionally, so that the futures-spot spread declines. This is because the convenience yield will also be higher after the increase in oil spot prices driven by the oil supply shock.
In contrast, a favorable oil demand shock driven by global economic activity and the accompanying rise in overall commodity demand will increase both oil production and oil prices as this shock is represented by an upward shift of the oil demand curve. By de…nition, such shocks are associated with an increase in global economic activity. A natural example of this type of shock is the surge in oil demand on the back of strong economic growth in emerging economies such as China and India. Again, to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition, the futures price will increase and the futures-spot spread will decline.
Finally, an unfavorable oil-speci…c demand shock is a demand shock for oil which is not driven by stronger economic growth. This shock also raises oil prices and oil production, but is associated with a negative, or rather non-positive, e¤ect on economic activity. As this oil price increase is also driven by fundamentals, the futures price will increase and the spread will decline according to the no-arbitrage condition. Two examples of this are an oil substitution shock and a shock to expected oil fundamentals. Rising demand for oil caused by increased substitution of coal for oil will drive up the price of oil, increase oil production and will not be favorable for economic activity because of the higher oil price. On the other hand, an expected fundamental shock, e.g. tighter expected oil supply or demand, will raise oil demand due to an increased demand for oil inventories. This will increase both the oil price and production, and will not stimulate economic activity as oil prices are higher. However, we do not restrict the response of inventories following the oil-speci…c shock to capture a broader set of oil-speci…c demand shocks beyond these expected fundamental shocks.
Kilian and Murphy (2010), in contrast, separately identify an expected oil fundamental shock in their SVAR model identi…ed with sign restrictions. Their expected fundamental shock is characterized as an oil inventory demand shock, which increases oil inventories, the oil price and production, and has a negative impact on world economic activity. As mentioned before, they interpret this expected fundamentals shock as a speculation shock.
We, however, focus on …nancial activity that is actually detrimental for the functioning of the oil futures market, i.e. all the trading activity in the futures market that can not be related to (expected) fundamentals. In our framework, we consider the expected oil fundamental shock of Kilian and Murphy (2010) as one that still re ‡ects e¢ cient market functioning, and is part of the more general fundamental oil-speci…c demand shock.
Another recent paper, also building on the Kilian and Murphy (2010) framework, is Juvenal and Petrella (2011). They work in a data-rich environment and identify structural shocks in the setting of a Factor-Augmented VAR model. However, their identi…cation strategy di¤ers from ours in that their …nancial speculative shock is pinned down by restricting inventories to accumulate and supply to decline. As such, this type of shock could also capture an increase in expected supply and demand tightness (e.g. faster than expected depletion of oil …elds). As a reaction to higher expected market tightness, producers may scale down their current output to bene…t from rising prices, and consumers will instead have the incentive to accumulate inventories. 17 Indeed, one of the factors 1 7 Depedning on the de…nition one adopts, this withdrawal of oil from the physical market could still be mentioned by market commentators as a contributor to the run-up in prices in [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] is the repeated downgrades in supply projections of non-OPEC countries, and a shock singled out using such restrictions may well capture such a factor, in addition to …nancial speculation.
As we only identify four oil shocks using a …ve-variable SVAR model, a residual shock will capture all the structural shocks not accounted for. This residual shock has no direct economic interpretation, and based on the results described in the next section, its importance in explaining oil spot and futures prices appears to be small. First, the exogenous oil supply shock causes oil production to decline and oil prices to increase permanently. A temporarily lower level of inventories partially counterbalances the fall in oil supply, although not signi…cantly, and the oil supply shock permanently reduces the level of economic activity. The dynamics of the response of the oil futures price is very similar to those of the oil price in the spot market, although the futures price increases by less so that the spread declines. This decline is only temporary, indicating that following the oil supply shock, the slope of the oil futures curve does not signi…cantly change in the somewhat longer term. Second, the permanent oil price increase caused by a shock in oil demand driven by economic activity is associated with a permanent increase in oil production and a positive e¤ect on industrial production, which is not surprising seen as speculative activity, but it is not neceassarily linked to index funds activity in the futures markets. 1 8 The results based on the 68 percentage range are not subject to this critique as they describe a range of possible outcomes.
Empirical results

E¤ects of di¤erent types of oil shocks
given that this shock is identi…ed as an aggregate demand shock that boosts demand for oil. Oil inventories tend to decrease temporarily to partially accommodate for the increased demand for oil, although this decline is not signi…cant. Again, the response of the oil futures price is very similar to the one of the spot price, and the spread temporarily declines. Third, the oil-speci…c demand shock also causes oil spot prices to be permanently higher. The increased demand for oil raises oil production and has a permanently negative e¤ect on the level of economic activity. Oil inventories do not respond signi…cantly, which is probably due to the fact that this shock captures a wide variety of oil-speci…c demand shocks with diverging e¤ects on inventories. 19 Again, the spread only declines in the short run. A typical oil demand shock driven by economic activity raises oil prices with about 4 percent on impact, which is somewhat higher than the impact e¤ect of a one standard deviation oil supply and oil-speci…c demand shock.
Interestingly, not only the fundamental shocks, but also the destabilizing …nancial shock a¤ects oil spot prices signi…cantly. As expected, this e¤ect on the oil spot price is only short-lived, in contrast to the oil price responses following the fundamental shocks which are permanent. The impact of a typical destabilizing …nancial shock on the oil price is about half the size as one driven by economic activity. The pass-through of the destabilizing …nancial shock in futures prices to the spot market price for oil is incomplete, and the futures-spot spread increases permanently. 20 We do not …nd a signi…cant reaction of oil production or oil inventories, nor do we …nd that destabilizing …nancial activity has real economic e¤ects. 21 The non-signi…cant response of oil inventories is interesting given the current discussion in the literature on the relationship between inventories and speculation. Much of the anecdotal evidence against a role of speculation is that during the past few years, there was no noticeable increase in inventories (e.g. Irwin and Sanders 1 9 For example, an expected fundamental shock is likely to increase inventories as agents in the physical market want to anticipate the future oil price increase, and a substitution shock is more likely to decrease oil inventories because of the unexpected increase in oil demand. 2 0 This implies that it is necessary to include futures market variables in the model when assessing the role of speculation, since relying on a full pass-through of futures price shocks to oil spot prices via the noarbitrage condition is not supported empirically. Therefore, the assumption made by Kilian and Murphy (2010) to not explicitly model the oil futures market when assessing the role of speculation, and only use spot oil market variables in their SVAR, is restrictive. 2 1 The non-signi…cant response of production can not be conclusive on the validity of the Hotelling principle, which argues that oil producers have the tendency to keep oil production in the ground as futures prices are higher than spot prices. We would expect this e¤ect to play only when the market is in contango, i.e. spot prices are lower than futures prices. 2010). However, using a simple theoretical model, Hamilton (2009) shows that speculation can a¤ect spot oil prices without triggering a signi…cant rise in inventories as long as the price elasticity of oil demand is small. We …nd that …nancial activity is indeed not necessarily associated with a signi…cant change in inventories but can still a¤ect the spot price of oil, if speculation is de…ned as ine¢ cient trading in the futures market. 22 
Relevance of di¤erent types of oil shocks
The impulse response analysis shows that destabilizing …nancial activity in the futures markets can matter as it signi…cantly a¤ects spot oil prices. The forecast error variance decomposition will shed some light on the overall importance of destabilizing …nancial trading for explaining the variability of oil spot prices over our sample, relative to the fundamental shocks. Figure 2 shows this forecast error decomposition of the oil spot price and the oil futures price. The variance decompositions are obtained using the posterior median draws at each point over the forecast horizon. 23 The left-hand side of Figure 2 displays the forecast error variance decomposition of the oil spot price. It is clear that the largest part of oil price ‡uctuations over our sample are explained by shocks to fundamentals. Over short forecast horizons, more than 90 percent of the forecast error is attributable to fundamental shocks in oil demand and supply. Not surprisingly, oil demand shocks driven by economic activity account for most part of this contribution, explaining more than 40 percent of the forecast error variance. Shocks to oil supply account for about 30 percent of the forecast error in the short run, which however declines in the longer run. Clearly, this implies that the importance of non-fundamental …nancial shocks is rather limited. Over di¤erent forecast horizons, the destabilizing …nan-cial shocks accounts for about 10 percent of the forecast error decomposition on average.
Although this contribution is very limited relative to those of the fundamental shocks, ine¢ cient trading can account for a non-negligible part of oil price variability.
The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows the forecast error decomposition of the futures 2 2 In their SVAR, Kilian and Murphy (2010) limit the response of inventories following their speculation shock by restricting the magnitude of the price elasticity of oil demand, in order to be consistent with the theoretical results of Hamilton's (2009) model on speculation. This is somehow counterintuitive as speculation is actually de…ned as a shock as an oil inventory shock in the spot market. By de…ning our shock di¤erently, i.e. an ine¢ ciency shock in the futures market, we do not need to impose this restriction.
price. Destabilizing …nancial activity plays a signi…cantly larger role in explaining futures price movements, contributing more than 20 percent to the forecast errors at very short horizons. This contribution declines somewhat at longer horizons, reaching 16 percent in the long run. Indeed, futures price variability is also for most part explained by shocks to (expected) fundamentals, and by oil demand shocks driven by economic activity in particular. The smaller contribution of the destabilizing …nancial shock in the spot market indicates that not all ine¢ cient trading in the oil futures markets is passed on to the oil spot market, which is consistent with the incomplete pass-through of the destabilizing …nancial shock to oil spot prices found in the impulse response analysis. Finally, note that the contribution of the non-identi…ed residual shock is very small in the short run, implying that the four shocks identi…ed in our framework capture almost the entire shortrun forecast error variability of oil spot and futures prices over our sample.
Explaining recent oil price ‡uctuations
Although ine¢ cient …nancial trading only explains a limited part of the overall oil price variability over our sample, speculative activity could still be important for understanding the ‡uctuations in oil prices over the last decade, and during 2007-2008 in particular.
To assess these contributions at each point in time, it is useful to look at the historical decomposition together with the nominal oil spot price in USD per barrel given in Figure   3 . The historical decompositions are obtained from the posterior median draw. 24 The historical contributions are accumulated and expressed in percentage deviations from the baseline unconditional forecast excluding the structural shocks. A declining contribution is associated with a negative shock that reduces oil prices, and vice versa. i.e. strong demand confronting stagnating supply. Using a simple theoretical model, however, he argues that speculation could have played a role as well in exacerbating price ‡uctuations, although fundamentals are likely to be more important. By testing this within an empirical framework, we …nd similar results for destabilizing …nancial activity. Figure 3 clearly shows that the considerable rise in oil prices was due to a series of oil demand shocks driven by economic activity, together with increasingly tighter oil supply which aggravated the upward move in oil prices. This can be linked to the observation that the capacity utilization rate at which OPEC was producing increased, leaving less room to absorb unexpected oil demand shocks. Interestingly, we …nd that also …nancial 
Robustness of the results
In this section, we assess whether the main conclusions of the paper still hold for reasonable changes in the speci…cation of the SVAR model. More speci…cally, we will evaluate whether it is still the case that the destabilizing …nancial shock (i) a¤ects the oil spot price signi…cantly but has no real economic e¤ects and (ii) only plays a limited role in explaining the variability in oil futures and spot prices over our sample because oil fundamentals are far more important. Moreover, we test whether the ine¢ cient …nancial trading shock (iii)
contributed to the recent oil price ‡uctuations, and caused oil spot prices to signi…cantly 
Conclusions
We analyzed the role of …nancial activity in determining the price of oil over the past two decades. As the activity of …nancial investors in oil futures markets can at the same time enhance and distort the price-setting mechanism in the oil market, we distinguish between two types of activity in the oil futures market. The …rst type of trading occurs on the back of fundamentals, and therefore makes price formation in the oil markets more e¢ cient. We identify three types of fundamental shocks, i.e. an oil supply shock, an oil-demand shock driven by economic activity and an oil-speci…c demand shock. Each shock has di¤erent e¤ects on the oil spot market variables and global economic activity.
The second type of activity in the futures market occurs independently of oil fundamentals and distorts the price signals in the oil market. We label this ine¢ cient shock as a destabilizing …nancial shock, and de…ne it as a deviation from the no-arbitrage condition which captures trading that is not consistent with movements in oil supply and demand.
In our view, this de…nition enables us to study the role of …nancial activity in the oil market more comprehensively than the literature has done so far. Moreover, as only …nancial activity that distorts e¢ cient price formation is not desirable, we argue that also this type of trading is more relevant for policy makers and regulators. We disentangle the di¤erent types of oil shocks using a structural VAR model of the global oil spot and futures market, of which the identi…cation restrictions are derived from a simple theoretical model.
Financial trading in futures markets matters as it can signi…cantly destabilize oil spot prices. The deviation from the fundamental level is only temporary, and the destabilizing …nancial shock has no real economic e¤ects, nor does it necessarily change inventories. 
Sign restrictions in practice
As mentioned in the text, we rely on the following structural VAR model to identify the impact of the di¤erent types of oil shocks:
with X t the vector of …ve endogenous variables (oil price, oil production, world industrial production, oil futures price and oil inventories), c a vector of constants, A (L) a matrix polynomial in the lag operator L and B the contemporaneous impact matrix of the vector of orthogonalized error terms " t . We want to estimate the e¤ects of four di¤erent types of oil shocks, i.e. oil supply shock, oil demand shock driven by economic activity, oil-speci…c demand shock and the destabilizing …nancial shock. However, it is not possible to estimate the contemporaneous impact matrix B and therefore identify the structural To uniquely disentangle the four types of oil shocks, we implement the sign restrictions which are explained in Section 3.2. We impose the sign restrictions to hold for the …rst 12 months after the shocks, except for the response of the spread which is only imposed contemporaneously.
As in Peersman (2005) , we use a Bayesian approach for estimation and inference.
Our prior and posterior distributions of the reduced form VAR belong to the NormalWishart family. To draw the "candidate truths" from the posterior, we take a joint draw from the unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for the VAR parameters as well as a random possible block lower triangular decomposition B of the variance-covariance matrix, which allows us to construct impulse response functions. If the impulse response functions from a particular draw satisfy the imposed sign conditions, the draw is kept.
Otherwise, the draw is rejected by giving it a zero prior weight. We require each draw to satisfy the restrictions of all four shocks simultaneously. Note that the restrictions following the destabilizing …nancial shock are only imposed on the futures price and the futures-spot spread, the responses of the spot oil market variables are fully determined by the data. A total of 1000 "successful" draws from the posterior are then used to show the 68 percent probability range of possible impulse responses to the shocks in Figure   1 , together with the median response. In general, we need 188179 draws to …nd 1000 successful identi…cations, which indicates that the data is relatively in favor of the model that generates the sign restrictions. When imposing additional sign restrictions on the bounds of the price elasticity of oil supply and demand, in line with Kilian and Murphy (2010), we need more than 355000 rotations for …nding one successful draw. 
